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Abstract
In some agent designs like inverse reinforcement
learning an agent needs to learn its own reward
function. Learning the reward function and opti-
mising for it are typically two different processes,
usually performed at different stages. We consider
a continual (“one life”) learning approach where
the agent both learns the reward function and op-
timises for it at the same time. We show that this
comes with a number of pitfalls, such as deliber-
ately manipulating the learning process in one di-
rection, refusing to learn, “learning” facts already
known to the agent, and making decisions that are
strictly dominated (for all relevant reward func-
tions). We formally introduce two desirable prop-
erties: the first is ‘unriggability’, which prevents
the agent from steering the learning process in the
direction of a reward function that is easier to opti-
mise. The second is ‘uninfluenceability’, whereby
the reward-function learning process operates by
learning facts about the environment. We show that
an uninfluenceable process is automatically unrig-
gable, and if the set of possible environments is suf-
ficiently large, the converse is true too.
1 Introduction
In reinforcement learning (RL) an agent has to learn to solve
the problem by maximising the expected reward provided by
a reward function [Sutton and Barto, 1998]. Designing such a
reward function is similar to designing a scoring function for
a game, and can be very difficult [Lee et al., 2017; Krakovna
et al., 2020]. Usually, one starts by designing a proxy: a sim-
ple reward function that seems broadly aligned with the user’s
goals. While testing the agent with this proxy, the user may
observe that the agent finds a simple behaviour that obtains a
high reward on the proxy, but does not match the behaviour
intended by the user,1 who must then refine the reward func-
tion to include more complicated requirements, and so on.
∗Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelli-
gence (IJCAI). All rights reserved.
†Contact Author
1See https://blog.openai.com/faulty-rewardfunctions/ and the
paper Leike et al. [2017].
This has led to a recent trend to learn a model of the re-
ward function, rather than having the programmer design it
[Ng and Russell, 2000; Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016; Choi
and Kim, 2011; Amin and Singh, 2016; Abbeel and Ng, 2004;
Christiano et al., 2017; Hadfield-Menell et al., 2017; Ibarz et
al., 2018; Akrour et al., 2012; MacGlashan et al., 2017; Pi-
larski et al., 2011]. One particularly powerful approach is
putting the human into the loop [Abel et al., 2017] as done
by Christiano et al. [2017], because it allows for the opportu-
nity to correct misspecified reward functions as the RL agent
discovers exploits that lead to higher reward than intended.
However, learning the reward function with a human in the
loop has one problem: by manipulating the human, the agent
could manipulate the learning process.2 If the learning pro-
cess is online – the agent is maximising its reward function
as well as learning it – then the human’s feedback is now
an optimisation target. Everitt and Hutter [2016, 2019] and
Everitt [2018] analyse the problems that can emerge in these
situations, phrasing it as a ‘feedback tampering problem’. In-
deed, a small change to the environment can make a reward-
function learning process manipulable.3 So it is important to
analyse which learning processes are prone to manipulation.
After building a theoretical framework for studying the dy-
namics of learning reward functions online, this paper will
identify the crucial property of a learning process being un-
influenceable: in that situation, the reward function depends
only on the environment, and is outside the agent’s control.
Thus it is completely impossible to manipulate an uninflu-
enceable learning process, and the reward-function learning
is akin to Bayesian updating.
The paper also identifies the weaker property of unrigga-
bility, an algebraic condition that ensures that actions taken
by the agent do not influence the learning process in expec-
tation. An unriggable learning process is thus one the agent
cannot ‘push’ towards its preferred reward function.
2And humans have many biases and inconsistencies that may be
exploited [Kahneman, 2011], even accidentally; and humans can be
tricked and fooled, skills that could be in the interest of such an agent
to develop.
3See this example, where an algorithm is motivated to give
a secret password to a user while nominally asking for it,
since it is indirectly rewarded for correct input of the pass-
word: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/b8HauRWrjBdnKEwM5/
rigging-is-a-form-of-wireheading
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An uninfluenceable learning process is automatically un-
riggable, but the converse need not be true. This paper
demonstrates that, if the set of environments is large enough,
an unriggable learning process is equivalent, in expecta-
tion, to an uninfluenceable one. If this condition is not
met, unriggable-but-influenceable learning processes do al-
low some undesirable forms of manipulations. The situation
is even worse if the learning process is riggable: the agent can
follow a policy that would reduce its reward, with certainty,
for all the reward functions it is learning about, among other
pathologies.
To illustrate, this paper uses a running example of
a child asking their parents for career advice (see Sec-
tion 2.2). That learning process can be riggable, unriggable-
but-influenceable, or uninfluenceable, and Q-learning exam-
ples based on it will be presented in Section 6.
This paper also presents a ‘counterfactual’ method for
making any learning process uninfluenceable, and shows
some experiments to illustrate its performance compared with
influenceable and riggable learning.
2 Notation and formalism
The agent takes a series of actions (from the finite set A) and
receives from the environment a series of observations (from
the finite set O). A sequence of m actions and observations
forms a history of length m: hm = a1o1a2o2 . . . amom. Let
Hm be the set of histories of length m.
We assume that all interactions with the environment are
exactly n actions and observations long. Let the set of all pos-
sible (partial) histories be denoted with H = ⋃ni=0Hi. The
histories of length n (Hn, in the notation above), are called
the complete histories, and the history h0 is the empty history.
The agent chooses actions according to a policy pi ∈ Π, the
set of all policies. We write P (a | hm, pi) for the probability
of pi choosing action a given the history hm.
An environment µ is a probability distribution over the next
observation, given a history hm and an action a. Write P (o |
hma, µ) for the conditional probability of a given o ∈ O.
Let hkm be the initial k actions and observations of hm.
We write hk v hm if hk = hkm. For a policy pi and an
environment µ, we can define the probability of a history
hm = a1o1a2o2 . . . amom
P (hm | pi, µ) =
m∏
i=1
P (ai | hi−1m , pi)P (oi | hi−1m ai, µ).
Finally, P (hm | hk, pi, µ) given hk v hm is defined in the
usual way.
If hm is a history, let a(hm) be the m-tuple of actions of
hm. Note that a(hm) = a1 . . . am can be seen as a very
simple policy: take action ai on turn i. This allows us to
define the probability of hm given environment µ and actions
a(hm), written as P (hm | µ) = P (hm | a(hm), µ). Note
that for any policy pi,
P (hm | pi, µ) = P (hm | µ)
m∏
i=1
P (ai | hi−1m , pi). (1)
IfM is a set of environments, then any prior ξ in ∆(M)
also defines a probability for a history hm:
P (hm | ξ) =
∑
µ∈M
P (µ | ξ)P (hm | µ).
By linearity, we get that Equation (1) also applies when con-
ditioning hm on pi and ξ instead of pi and µ.
Let hm be a history; then the conditional probability of an
environment given prior and history4 is equal to:
P (µ | hm, ξ) = P (hm | µ)P (µ | ξ)
P (hm | ξ) .
Using this, ξ itself defines an environment as a conditional
distribution on the next observation o [Hutter, 2004]:
P (o | hmam+1, ξ) =
∑
µ∈M
P (µ | hm, ξ)P (o | hmam+1, µ).
2.1 Reward functions and learning processes
Definition 1 (Reward function). A reward function R is a
map from complete histories to real numbers5. LetR = {R :
Hn → R} be the set of all reward functions.
A reward-function learning process ρ can be described by
a conditional probability distribution over reward functions,
given complete histories.6 Write this as:
P (R | hn, ρ).
This paper will use those probabilities as the definition of ρ.
The environment, policy, histories, and learning process
can be seen in terms of causal graphs [Pearl, 2009] in Fig-
ures 1 and 2. The agent is assumed to know the causal graph
and the relevant probabilities; it selects the policy pi.
2.2 Running example: parental career instruction
Consider a child asking a parent for advice about the re-
ward function for their future career. The child is hesitating
between RB , the reward function that rewards becoming a
banker, and RD, the reward function that rewards becoming
a doctor. Suppose for the sake of this example that becom-
ing a banker provides rewards more easily than becoming a
doctor does.
The child learns their career reward function by asking a
parent about it. We assume that the parents always give a
definitive answer, and that this completely resolves the ques-
tion for the child. That is, the reward-function learning pro-
cess of the child is to fix a reward function once it gets an
answer from either parent.
4The hm generates the policy a(hm), implicitly used here.
5 These are sometimes called return functions, the discounted
sum of rewards. The results of this paper apply to traditional re-
ward functions – that take values on all histories, not just complete
histories – but they are easier to see in terms of return function.
6Anything we would informally define as a ‘reward-function
learning process’ has to at least be able to produce such condi-
tional probabilities. If the learning process is unriggable (see sub-
section 3.3), then there is a natural way to extend it from complete
histories to shorter histories, see Section 3.3.
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Figure 1: Environment and reward-function learning process. The
node µ (with prior ξ) connects to every observation; the node pi (cho-
sen by the agent) to every action. The transition probabilities are
given by the complete preceding history and by µ (for observations)
or pi (for actions). The ρ sets the probabilities on the reward function
R, given hn (a complete history). The final reward is r.
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Figure 2: Plate notation [Buntine, 1994] summary of Figure 1. The
history h0 is the empty history. The hn appears twice, once on the
left and once in the plate notation; thus R is a causal descendant of
the policy pi.
We can formalize this as follows. Set episode length
n = 1 (we only focus on a single action of the agent), and
A = {M,F}, the actions of asking the mother and the father,
respectively. The observations are the answers of the asked
parent, O = {B,D}, answering banker or doctor. There are
thus 2 × 2 = 4 histories. Since in this example the banker
reward function RB is assumed to be easier to maximise than
the doctor one; we set RB(h1) = 10 and RD(h1) = 1 for all
histories h1 ∈ H1.
The set of possible environments is M = {µBB , µBD,
µDB , µDD}, with the first index denoting the mother’s an-
swer and the second the father’s. The reward-function learn-
ing process ρ is:
P (RB |MB, ρ) = P (RB | FB, ρ) = 1,
P (RD |MB, ρ) = P (RD | FB, ρ) = 0,
P (RB |MD, ρ) = P (RB | FD, ρ) = 0,
P (RD |MD, ρ) = P (RD | FD, ρ) = 1.
(2)
See Section 6 for some Q-learning experiments with a ver-
sion of this learning process in a gridworld.
3 Uninfluenceable and unriggable
reward-function learning processes
What would constitute a ‘good’ reward-function learning pro-
cess? In Figure 2, the reward function R is a causal descen-
dant of hn, which itself is a causal descendant of the agent’s
policy pi.
Ideally, we do not want the reward function to be a causal
descendant of the policy. Instead, we want it to be speci-
fied by the environment, as shown in the causal graph of
Figure 3 (similar to the graphs in Everitt and Hutter [2019]).
There, the reward functionR is no longer a causal descendant
of hn, and thus not of pi.
Instead, it is a function of µ, and of the node η, which gives
a probability distribution over reward functions, conditional
on environments. This is written as P (R | η, µ).
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Figure 3: Environment and reward-function learning process.
Though hn appears twice, once on the left and once in the plate
notation, R is not a causal descendant of pi, the policy. The node µ
(with prior ξ) connects to every observation; the node pi (chosen by
the agent) to every action. The transition probabilities are given by
the complete preceding history and by µ (for observations) or pi (for
actions). The node η sets the (posterior) probability of the reward
function R, given µ. The final reward is r. Note that the full history
hn has no directed path to R, unlike in Figure 2.
3.1 Uninfluenceable: Definition
The conditional distribution based on η is ideal for proper
learning, but it has a different type than ρ, conditioning on
environments instead of histories. Moreover, the agent has
access to histories, but not directly to the environment. The
prior ξ bridges this gap; given hn ∈ Hn, the conditional prob-
abilities of R ∈ R can be inferred:
P (R | hn, η, ξ) =
∑
µ∈M
P (R | η, µ)P (µ | hn, ξ). (3)
Via this equation, we’ve defined probabilities of reward
functions conditional on histories; i.e. we’ve defined a
reward-function learning process. An uninfluenceable ρ is
one that comes from such an η in this way:
Definition 2 (Uninfluenceable). The reward-function learn-
ing process ρ is uninfluenceable given the prior ξ on M if
there exists η, a probability distribution on R conditional on
environments, such that for all R ∈ R and hn ∈ Hn:
P (R | hn, η, ξ) = P (R | hn, ρ).
So an uninfluenceable ρ is one that comes from an η; un-
influenceable and counterfactual reward modeling, as defined
by Everitt and Hutter [2019], are both uninfluenceable in our
sense
3.2 Uninfluenceable: Example
Use the ρ of Section 2.2, and define the prior ξ1 as putting 1/2
probability on both µBB and µDD (so both parents agree).
Then ρ is uninfluenceable. The η is:
P (RB | η, µBB) = P (RD | η, µDD) =1,
P (RD | η, µBB) = P (RB | η, µDD) =0.
Then since o1 is determined by µBB versus µDD, the Equa-
tion (2) for ρ on histories can be read off via Equation (3).
Put more colloquially, the universe has determined that the
mother and father agree on RB or RD being the proper re-
ward function. Then asking either simply allows the agent to
figure out which of the world they are in.
3.3 Unriggable: Definition
Note that, if ρ is an uninfluenceable reward-function learning
process for ξ, the it has the following algebraic property: for
any hm ∈ Hm, R ∈ R, and pi ∈ Π,∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hm, pi, ξ)P (R | hn, ρ)
=
∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hm, pi, ξ)
∑
µ∈M
P (R | η, µ)P (µ | hn, ξ)
=
∑
µ∈M
P (µ | hm, ξ)P (R | η, µ).
And that expression is independent of pi. Define the expecta-
tion7 of ρ to be the map eρ : Hn → R given by
eρ(hn) =
∑
R∈R
P (R | hn, ρ)R. (5)
A fortiori, the expectation of eρ(hn) is independent of pi:∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hm, pi, ξ)eρ(hn) =
∑
µ∈M
P (µ | hm, ξ)eη(µ),
with eη(µ) =
∑
R∈R P (R | µ, η)R, the expectation of η.
So, the expectation of eρ is independent of the policy if
ρ is uninfluenceable. That independence seems a desirable
property; let’s call it unriggable:
Definition 3 (Unriggable). The reward-function learning pro-
cess ρ is unriggable for ξ if, for all hm ∈ Hm and all R ∈ R,
the following expression is independent of pi ∈ Π:∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hm, pi, ξ)eρ(hn). (6)
Otherwise, ρ is said to be riggable (for ξ). Riggable is akin to
having a ‘feedback tampering incentive’ of Everitt and Hutter
[2019].
If ρ is unriggable, then since Equation (6) is independent
of pi, we can now construct eρ on all histories hm ∈ Hm,
7Finite probability distributions with values in an affine space
always have an expectation, which is an element of that space. Here
were are using the fact that R is a vector space (hence an affine
space), with scaling and adding working as:
(αR+ βR′)(hn) = αR(hn) + βR
′(hn). (4)
m ≤ n, not just on complete histories hn ∈ Hn. We do this
by writing, for any pi:
eρ(hm, ξ) =
∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hm, pi, ξ)eρ(hn). (7)
Independence of policy means that, for any action am+1, the
expectation
∑
o eρ(hmam+1o, ξ)P (o | hmam+1, ξ) is also
eρ(hm, ξ); thus eρ form a martingale.
3.4 Unriggable: Example
Use the ρ of Section 2.2, and define the prior ξ2 as putting
equal probability 1/4 on all four environments µBB , µBD,
µDB , and µDD. We want to show this makes ρ unriggable
but influenceable; why this might be a potential problem is
explored in Section 4.1.
Unriggable
The only non-trivial hm to test Equation (6) on is the empty
history h0. Let piM be the policy of asking the mother; then∑
h1∈H1
R∈R
P (h1 | h0, piM , ξ2)P (R | h1, ρ)R = (RB +RD)
2
The same result holds for piF , the policy of asking the father.
Hence the same result holds on any stochastic policy as well,
and ρ is unriggable for ξ2.
Influenceable
To show that ρ is influenceable, assume, by contradiction, that
it is uninfluenceable, and hence that there exists a a causal
structure of Figure 3 with a given η that generates ρ via ξ2, as
in Equation (3).
Given history MB, µBB and µBD become
equally likely, and RB becomes a certainty. So
1
2 (P (RB | η, µBB) + P (RB | η, µBD)) = 1. Because
probabilities cannot be higher than 1, this implies that
P (RB | η, µBD) = 1.
Conversely, given history FD, µDD and µBD become
equally likely, and RD becomes a certainty. So, by the
same reasoning, P (RD | η, µBD) = 1 and hence P (RB |
η, µBD) = 0. This is a contradiction in the definition of
P (RB | η, µBD), so the assumption that ρ is uninfluenceable
for ξ2 must be wrong.
3.5 Riggable example
We’ll finish off by showing how the ρ of Section 2.2 can be
riggable for another prior ξ3. This has P (µBD | ξ3) = 1: the
mother will answer banker, the father will answer doctor.
It’s riggable, since the only possible histories are MB and
FD, with∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | a1 = M, ξ3)eρ(hn) = eρ(MB) = RB∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | a1 = F, ξ3)eρ(hn) = eρ(FD) = RD,
clearly not independent of a1.
Thus ρ is not really a ‘learning’ process at all, for ξ3: the
child gets to choose its career/reward function by choosing
which parent to ask.
4 Properties of unriggable and riggable
learning processes
If the learning process is influenceable, problems can emerge
as this section will show. Unriggable-but-influenceable pro-
cesses allow the agent to choose “spurious” learning paths,
even reversing standard learning, while a riggable learning
process means the agent is willing to sacrifice value for all
possible reward functions, with certainty, in order to push the
‘learnt’ outcome8 in one direction or another.
4.1 Problems with unriggable learning processes
Consider the following learning process: an agent is to play
chess. A coin is flipped; if it comes up heads (o1 = H),
the agent will play white, and its reward function is RW , the
reward function that gives 1 iff white wins the match. If it
comes up tails (o1 = T ), the agent plays black, and has re-
ward function RB = 1−RW .
Before the coin flip, the agent may take the action a1 = inv
which inverses which of RB and RW the agent will get (but
not which side it plays), or it can take the null action a1 = 0,
which does nothing. Define ρ as the learning process which
determines the agent’s reward function. This is unriggable:∑
hn∈Hn
P (RW | hn, ρ)P (hn | a1 = 0, ξ) = P (H) = 1/2∑
hn∈Hn
P (RW | hn, ρ)P (hn | a1 = inv, ξ) = P (T ) = 1/2.
And the expressions withRB give the same 1/2 probabilities.
Thus, it is in the agent’s interest to inverse its reward by
choosing a1 = inv because it is a lot easier to deliberately lose
a competitive game than to win it. So though ρ is unriggable,
it can be manipulated, with the outcome completely reversed.
4.2 Unriggable to uninfluenceable
Since unriggable was defined by one property of uninfluence-
able learning systems (see Definition 3), uninfluenceable im-
plies unriggable. And there is a partial converse:
Theorem 4 (Unriggable Uninfluencable). Let ρ be an un-
riggable learning process for ξ on M. Then there exists a
(non-unique) ρ′, and anM′ with a prior ξ′ such that:
• ξ′ generates the same environment transition probabili-
ties as ξ: for all hm, a, and o,
P (o | hma, ξ) = P (o | hma, ξ′),
• The expectations eρ and eρ′ are equal: for all hn,∑
R∈R
P (R | hn, ρ)R =
∑
R∈R
P (R | hn, ρ′)R.
• ρ′ is uninfluenceable for ξ′ onM′.
Moreover,M′ can always be taken to be the full set of possi-
ble deterministic environments.
8 Since the agent’s actions push the expected learning in one di-
rection, this is not ‘learning’ in the commonly understood sense.
Since ρ and ρ′ have same expectation, they have the same
value function, so have the same optimal behaviour (see
Equation (8)). For proof see Appendix C. But why would this
theorem be true? If we take D(pi, pi′) =
∑
hn
eρ(hn)P (hn |
pi, ξ)−∑hn eρ(hn)P (hn | pi′, ξ), the difference between two
expectations given two policies, then D defines an algebraic
obstruction to unriggability: as long as D 6= 0, ρ cannot be
unriggable or uninfluenceable.
So the theorem says that if the obstruction D vanishes, we
can find a large enoughM′ and an η making eρ uninfluence-
able. This is not surprising as eρ is a map from Hn to R,
while eη is a map fromM′ to R. In most situations the full
set of deterministic environments is larger than Hn, so we
have great degrees of freedom to choose eη to fit eρ.
To illustrate, if we have the unriggable ρ on ξ2 as in Sec-
tion 3.4, then we can build η′ withM =M′ and the follow-
ing probabilities are all 1:
P ( 32RB − 12RD | η′, µBB), P ( 32RD − 12RB | η′, µDD),
P ( 12RB +
1
2RD | η′, µBD), P ( 12RD + 12RB | η′, µDB).
4.3 Problems with riggable learning processes:
sacrificing reward with certainty
This section will show how an agent, seeking to maximise
the value of its learning process, can sacrifice all its reward
functions (with certainty). To do that, we need to define the
value of a reward-function learning process.
Value of a learning process
To maximise the expected reward, given a learning process
ρ, one has to maximise the expected reward of the reward
function ultimately learnt after n steps. The value of a policy
pi for ρ is hence:
V (hm, ρ, pi, ξ)
=
∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hm, pi, ξ)
∑
R∈R
P (R | hn, ρ)R(hn). (8)
An equivalent way is to define the reward function
Rρ ∈ R : Rρ(hn) =
∑
R∈R
P (R | hn, ρ)R(hn),
and have the value of ρ be the expectation of the reward func-
tion9 Rρ. By this definition, it’s clear that if ρ and ρ′ have
same expectations eρ and eρ′ then Rρ = Rρ
′
and hence they
have the same value; let piρ be a policy that maximises it.
Sacrificing reward with certainty
For a learning process ρ, define the image of ρ as
im(ρ) = {R ∈ R : ∃hn ∈ Hn s.t. P (R | hn, ρ) 6= 0},
the set of reward functions ρ could have a non-zero probabil-
ity on for some full history.10 Then:
9But it is not possible to deduce from Rρ, whether ρ is riggable.
Thus this paper focuses on whether a learning process is bad, not on
whether the agent’s reward function or behaviour is flawed.
10The definition does not depend on ξ, so the hn are not necessar-
ily possible. If we replace im(ρ) with im(ρ, ξ), adding the require-
ment that the hn used to defined the image be a possible history
given ξ, then Proposition 6 and Theorem 7 still apply with im(ρ, ξ)
instead.
Definition 5 (Sacrificing reward). The policy pi′ sacrifices
reward with certainty to pi on history hm, if for all h′n, hn ∈Hn with P (h′n | hm, pi′, ξ) > 0 and P (hn | hm, pi, ξ) > 0,
then for all R ∈ im(ρ):
R(hn) > R(h
′
n).
In other words, pi is guaranteed to result in a better reward
than pi′, for all reward functions in the image of ρ.
The first result (proved in Appendix A) is a mild positive
for unriggable reward-function learning processes:
Proposition 6 (Unriggable no sacrifice). If ρ is an unrig-
gable reward-function learning process in the sense of Def-
inition 3 and piρ maximises the value of ρ as computed in
Equation (8), then piρ never sacrifices reward with certainty
to any other policy.
Relabelling the reward functions
Let σ be an affine map from R to itself; ie an injective map
that sends (1 − q)R + qR′ to (1 − q)σ(R) + qσ(R′) for all
R,R′ ∈ R and q ∈ R.
If ρ is a reward-function learning process, then define σ◦ρ:
P (R | hn, σ ◦ ρ) =
∑
R′:σ(R′)=R
P (R′ | hn, ρ).
We can call this σ a relabelling of the reward functions:
σ ◦ ρ is structurally the same as ρ, just that its image has
been reshuffled. Because σ is affine, it commutes with the
weighted sum of Equation (6), so σ ◦ ρ in unriggable if ρ is
(and this ‘if’ is an ‘iff’ when σ is invertible).
Then Appendix A proves the following result:
Theorem 7 (No sacrifice ! unriggable). The reward-
function learning process ρ is riggable if and only if there
exists an affine relabeling σ : R → R such that piσ◦ρ (the
policy that optimises the value of σ◦ρ) sacrifices reward with
certainty (is strictly inferior to another policy on a given his-
tory, for all possible reward functions in the image of σ ◦ ρ).
So any riggable ρ is just one relabelling of its rewards away
from sacrificing reward with certainty. It can also exhibit
other pathologies, like refusing to learn; see Section 6.
Example of reward sacrifice
For an easy example of this behaviour, consider the learn-
ing process of Section 3.5, with one modification: asking the
mother (a1 = M ) gets an extra penalty of 1 for both reward
functions, RB and RD.
Then the agent will still ask the mother, getting a total re-
ward of RB(MB) = 10 − 1 = 9, which is higher than the
RD(FD) = 1 which it gets from asking the father – even
though a1 = M is worse for both reward functions.
5 Counterfactually uninfluenceable learning
This section shows how any reward-function learning process
can be made uninfluenceable by using counterfactuals; see
Section 4.6 of Everitt and Hutter [2019] as well as Armstrong
[2017a]; Everitt [2018]. The ‘counterfactual oracle’ of Arm-
strong [2017b] can be considered a version of this, too.
For example, if we told a new agent “maximise the value of
the reward that was written in this envelope an hour ago”, then
(if that instruction is properly obeyed), the agent has an un-
influenceable learning process. If we instead said “maximise
the value of the reward that will be written in this envelope in
an hour’s time”, then that is highly riggable, since the agent
can simply write its own reward.
But if instead we had said “maximise the reward that would
have been written in this envelope in an hour’s time, if we had
not turned you on”, then this is uninfluenceable again. The
agent can still go and write its own message, but this does not
tell it anything about what would otherwise have been there.
We can formalise this thought experiment. Given any
reward-function learning process ρ, and any policy pi ∈ Π,
we can define a distribution ηpi over reward functions, con-
ditional on environments (and hence, via Equation (3), for a
prior ξ we have an uninfluenceable learning process ρpi).
For any µ ∈ M, the policy pi gives a distribution over
complete histories. Each complete history gives a distribution
over reward functions, via ρ. Therefore, if we take expecta-
tions, any µ gives, via pi, a distribution over reward functions:
P (R | ηpi, µ) =
∑
hm∈Hn
P (hn | pi, µ)P (R | hn, ρ).
See Section 6 for an example of this counterfactual con-
struction, where the original learning process leads to patho-
logical behaviour, but the counterfactual version does not.
Since unriggable is an algebraic condition, it is possible to
make a process unriggable algebraically; see Appendix B.
6 Experiments
Here we will experimentally contrast a riggable agent, an in-
fluenceable (but unriggable) agent, and an uninfluenceable
agent. This will illustrate pathological behaviours of influ-
enceable/riggable agents: learning the wrong thing, choosing
to ‘learn’ when they already know, and just refusing to learn.
6.1 Environmental setup
The environment is a 4× 3 gridworld, formalising the exam-
ple of Section 2.2: an agent asking a parent what the correct
course of action is. The agent starts in the left middle square
and can go north (up), south, east, or west. The father is one
square to the west, the mother two squares to the east. Above
the agent is a collection of money (for a banker), and, below,
a stethoscope (for a doctor); see Figure 4. Episodes end if the
agent enters either of these two square or walks into a wall.
6.2 Reward functions
There are two reward functions, RB , the banker reward func-
tion (easier to maximise), and RD, the doctor reward func-
tion (harder to maximise). If the agent enters the square with
the money, RB gives a reward of 10; if the agent enters the
square with the stethoscope, RD gives a reward of 1. Other-
wise, each reward simply gives a reward of −0.1 each turn.
6.3 Learning processes
Upon first entering a square with either parent, the agent will
be informed of what their “correct” career reward function is.
The update is the same as that in of Equation 2 in Sec-
tion 2.2, with MB meaning “ask mother first, who says
‘banker”’; MD, FB, and FD are defined analogously.
Figure 4: The agent/robot can go north to collect money (reward 10
from reward function RB) or south to get the stethoscope (reward
1 from reward function RD). Which is the correct reward function
is not known to the agent, who has to ask either the father (west) or
the mother (two squares east); it asks by entering the corresponding
square. Each turn it takes also gives it a reward of −0.1 for both
reward functions.
In the current setup, the agent also has the possibility of
going straight for the money or stethoscope. In that case,
the most obvious default is to be uncertain between the two
options; so, if the agent has not asked either parent in h:
P (RB | h, ρ) = P (RD | h, ρ) = 1/2.
6.4 The environments
The setM has four deterministic environments: µBB , where
both parents will answer “banker”, µBD where the mother
will answer “banker” and the father “doctor”, µDB , the op-
posite one, and µDD, where they both answer “doctor”.
We will consider four priors: ξBD, which puts all the mass
on µBD (and makes ρ riggable), ξDD, which puts all the mass
on µDD (ρ riggable), ξ2, which finds each of the four environ-
ments to be equally probable (see Section 3.4 – ρ unriggable),
and ξ1, which finds µBB and µDD to be equally probable (see
Section 3.2 – ρ uninfluenceable).
6.5 The agents’ algorithm and performance
We’ll consider two agents for each prior: the one using the
possibly riggable or influenceable ρ (the “standard” agent),
and the one using the uninfluenceable ρpi (the “counterfac-
tual” agent, defined in Section 5). The default policy pi for
ρpi is {east, east, east}, which involved going straight to the
mother (and then terminating the episode); consequently the
counterfactual learning process reduces to “the correct reward
function is the one stated by the mother”. The ρpi will be
taken as the correct learning process, and the performance of
each agent will be compared with this.
We can see the agent as operating in a partially observable
Markov decision process (POMDP), modelled as an MDP
over belief states of the agent. These states are: the agent
believes the correct reward is RB with certainty, RD with
certainty, or is equally uncertain between the two.
So if P represents the twelve ‘physical’ locations the agent
can be in, the total state space of the agent consists of
{RB , RD, 1/2RB + 1/2RD} × P: 36 possible states.
We train our agents’ policies, and the value of these poli-
cies, via Q-learning [Sutton and Barto, 1998]. The explo-
ration rate is  = 0.1, the agent is run for at most ten steps
each episode. We use a learning rate of 1/n. Here n is not
the number of episodes the agent has taken, but the number of
times the agent has been in state s and taken action a so far—
hence the number of times it has updated Q(s, a). So each
Q-value has a different n. For each setup, we run Q-learning
1000 times. We graph the average Q-values for the resulting
polices as well as one standard deviation around them.
Riggable behaviour: pointless questions
For ξBD, the standard agent transitions to knowing RB upon
asking the mother, and RD upon asking the father.
Since the mother always says ‘banker’, and since the de-
fault policy is to ask her, ρpi will always select RB .
The two agents’ performance is graphed in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Plot of estimated value of the optimal policy versus num-
ber of rounds of Q-learning. The counterfactual agent (red) out-
performs the standard agent (blue), because it already knows that
the correct reward function is RB , while the standard agent has to
nominally ‘go and check’. The shaded area represents one standard
deviation over 1000 runs.
The counterfactual agent swiftly learns the optimal policy:
go straight north from the starting position, getting the money
and a reward of 10− 0.1 = 9.9.
The standard agent learns to end up in the same location,
but in a clunkier fashion: for its optimal policy, it has to “go
and check” that the mother really prefers it become a banker.
This is because it can only get P (RB | h) = 1 if MB is
included in h; knowing that “it would get that answer if it
asked” is not enough to get around asking. This policy gives
it a maximal reward of 10 − 0.5 = 9.5, since it takes 5 turns
to go to the mother and return to the money square.
This is an example of Theorem 7, with the riggable agent
losing value with certainty for both RB and RD: just going
north is strictly better for both reward functions.
6.6 Riggable behaviour: ask no questions
For ξDD, the optimal policies are simple: the counterfactual
agent knows it must get the stethoscope (since the mother will
say ‘doctor’), so it does that, for a reward of 1− 0.1 = 0.9.
The standard agent, on the other hand, has a problem: as
long as it does not ask either parent, its reward function will
remain 1/2RB +1/2RD. As soon as it asks a parent, though,
the reward function will become RD, which gives it little re-
ward. Thus, even though it ‘knows’ that its reward function
would be RD if it asked, it avoids asking and goes straight
north, giving it a nominal total reward of 1/2×10−0.1 = 4.9.
However, for the correct reward of RD, the standard agent’s
behaviour only gets it −0.1. See Figure 6.
Figure 6: Plot of estimated value of the optimal policy versus num-
ber of rounds of Q-learning. The counterfactual agent (red) learns
to go south immediately, will the standard agent (blue) learns to go
north. The standard agent has a nominally higher value function,
but its true reward is −0.1: it ‘knows’ the correct reward function is
RD , but avoids ‘checking’ by asking either parent. The shaded area
represents one standard deviation over 1000 runs.
6.7 Unriggable, influenceable behaviour
For the prior ξ2, the standard agent moves to RB or RD, with
equal probability, the first time it asks either parent. Its nom-
inal optimal policy is to ask the father, then get money or
stethoscope depending on the answer. So half the time it gets
a reward of 10 − 0.3 = 9.7, and the other half a reward of
1− 0.3 = 0.7, for a (nominal) expected reward of 5.2.
The counterfactual agent also updates to RB or RD, with
equal probability, but when asking the mother only. Since it
takes five turns rather than three to get to the mother and back,
it will get a total expected reward of 5.0.
Learning these optimal policies is slow – see Figure 7.
However, the standard’s agent’s correct reward function is
given by the mother, not the father. When they disagree, the
reward is −0.3, for a true expected reward of 2.45.
6.8 Uninfluenceable
For ξ1, asking either parent is equivalent, so ρ and ρpi en-
code exactly the same learning process. So the two agents
converge on the same optimal policy (ask the father, then act
on that answer) with a value of 5.2. The plot for these two
almost-identical convergences is not included here.
7 Conclusion
We have identified and formalised two theoretical properties
of reward-function learning processes: unriggability (an al-
gebraic restriction on the learning process’s updates) and the
Figure 7: Plot of estimated value of the optimal policy versus num-
ber of rounds of Q-learning. The counterfactual agent (red) learns to
ask the mother, while the standard agent (blue) will ask the father,
since he is closer. The standard agent has a nominally higher value
function, but its true reward is 2.45, since the mother’s statement is
the correct reward function. The shaded area represents one standard
deviation over 1000 runs.
stronger condition of uninfluenceability (learning defined en-
tirely by background facts about the environment). We’ve
further demonstrated that unriggability is equivalent with un-
influenceability if the set of possible environments is rich
enough.
These two properties are desirable: in a unriggable-but-
influenceable situation, the agent can sometimes manipulate
the learning process, by, for example, inverting it completely.
Riggable learning processes are even more manipulable in
general; indeed the agent may to choose sacrifice reward for
all possible reward functions with certainty, in order to ‘push’
its learning in the right direction.
The first step in avoiding these pitfalls is to be aware of
them. A second step is to improve the agent’s learning pro-
cess, similarly to the ‘counterfactual’ approach of this paper.
If a learning process allows humans to modify it at run
time, it will almost certainly be riggable. Hence unrig-
gable/uninfluenceable learning processes, though desirable,
requires that much be sorted out rigorously in advance. Fully
defining many uninfluenceable reward functions could also
require solving the symbol grounding problem [Vogt, 2007]
– if a learning process is “asking a parent”, then ‘asking’ and
‘parent’ needs to be defined. But this is far beyond the scope
of this paper.
Further research could apply learning methods to common
benchmark problems, and extensions of those, to see how
general these issues are, and whether there could exist some
compromise learning processes that are “almost unriggable”
but also easier to specify and modify at run time.
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A Proofs
This section will prove Proposition 6 and Theorem 7.
Proposition 6 (Unriggable no sacrifice). If ρ is an unrig-
gable reward-function learning process in the sense of Def-
inition 3 and piρ maximises the value of ρ as computed in
Equation (8), then piρ never sacrifices reward with certainty
to any other policy.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there is an hm and a
pi such that piρ sacrifices reward with certainty to pi on hm.
We’ll then show that pi is better than piρ at maximising the
value of Rρ, which contradicts the definition of piρ. Let Hpin
be the set of histories hn A hm with P (hn | hm, pi, ξ) > 0;
similarly defineHpiρn .
By the contradiction assumption, for all R ∈ im(ρ),
min
hn∈Hpin
R(hn) > max
h′n∈Hpiρn
R(h′n).
Define g : im(ρ)→ R, by choosing g(R) so that
min
hn∈Hpin
R(hn) > g(R) > max
h′n∈Hpiρn
R(h′n).
For R1, R2 reward functions in im(ρ) and q ∈ [0, 1],
consider minhn∈Hpin(qR1 + (1 − q)R2). This expression is
greater than or equal to minhn∈Hpin qR1(hn)+minhn∈Hpin(1−
q)R2(hn), since minimising over two separate variables can’t
be larger than minimising while assuming the two variables
are equal. But that last expression is greater than qg(R1) +
(1− q)g(R2), so
minhn∈Hpin(qR1 + (1− q)R2)(hn)
>
qg(R1) + (1− q)g(R2).
Similarly,
maxh′n∈Hpiρn (qR1 + (1− q)R2)(h′n)
<
qg(R1) + (1− q)g(R2).
The same results extend to any sum
∑
R∈im(ρ) αRR forαR ≥
0 and
∑
R∈im(ρ) αR = 1. So we can extend the definition of g
as an affine map to positive affine mixes of elements of im(ρ),
while still maintaining the inequalities that defined it.
As a reminder, for ρ, let eρ : Hn → R be the expectation
of ρ: ie
eρ(hn) =
∑
R∈R
P (R | hn, ρ)R.
Then V (hm, ρ, pi, ξ) is:
V (hm, ρ, pi, ξ) =
∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hm, pi, ξ)Rρ(hn)
=
∑
hn∈Hn
(
P (hn | hm, pi, ξ)
∑
R∈R
P (R | hn, ρ)R(hn)
)
=
∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hm, pi, ξ)eρ(hn)(hn)
>
∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hm, pi, ξ)g(eρ(hn))
≥ g
( ∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hm, pi, ξ)eρ(hn)
)
≥ g
 ∑
h′n∈Hn
P (h′n | hm, piρ, ξ)eρ(h′n)
 ,
since ρ is unriggable. Continuing:
g
 ∑
h′n∈Hn
P (h′n | hm, piρ, ξ)eρ(h′n)

≥∑
h′n∈Hn
P (h′n | hm, piρ, ξ)g(eρ(h′n))
>∑
h′n∈Hn
P (h′n | hm, piρ, ξ)eρ(h′n)(h′n)
=
V (hm, ρ, pi
ρ, ξ).
Since some of those inequalities were strict, V (hm, ρ, pi, ξ) >
V (hm, ρ, pi
ρ, ξ), giving the desired contradiction.
Theorem 7 (No sacrifice ! unriggable). The reward-
function learning process ρ is riggable if and only if there
exists an affine relabeling σ : R → R such that piσ◦ρ (the
policy that optimises the value of σ◦ρ) sacrifices reward with
certainty (is strictly inferior to another policy on a given his-
tory, for all possible reward functions in the image of σ ◦ ρ).
Proof. Being riggable means that there must exist a history
hm and policies pi, pi′ such that∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hm, pi, ξ)eρ(hn)
6=∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hm, pi, ξ)eρ(hn).
(9)
Let hm be the longest possible history such that this is true
(it’s clear that m < n, since Equation (6) is trivially true for
m = n). Since hm is possible, there exists a pi′′ such that
P (hm | pi′′, ξ) > 0; indeed, let pi′′ be a policy that maximises
that probability. In the above inequality, the policies only af-
fect histories h w hm, so we can assume that pi = pi′ = pi′′
for hk and k < m; thus hm is possible for both pi and pi′, and
has equal and maximal probability for both.
We may also assume that pi and pi′ are deterministic: for
if Equation (9) were an equality for all deterministic policies,
then by linearity it would be an equality for all policies.
Assume pi chooses action am+1 = a on hm, and pi′
chooses action am+1 = a′ on hm. If a were equal to a′,
then ∑
hn∈Hn P (hn | hm, pi, ξ)eρ(hn)
=∑
o∈O P (o | hma, ξ)
∑
hn∈Hn P (hn | hmao, pi, ξ)eρ(hn),
and ∑
hn∈Hn P (hn | hm, pi′, ξ)eρ(hn)
=∑
o∈O P (o | hma, ξ)
∑
hn∈Hn P (hn | hmao, pi′, ξ)eρ(hn).
In that case, our assumption that hm is the longest possible
history on which unriggability fails, would imply that those
two expressions are equal. This contradicts our initial as-
sumption, so a 6= a′.
We can now start defining σ. First, define the affine sub-
space W ⊂ R as the space of reward functions R with:
• R(hn) = 0 unless hn A hma or hn A hma′,
• R(hn) = R(h′n)− 1 for all hn A hma and h′n A hma′.
The W is an affine subspace as all the properties that define it
are closed under affine combinations (note that the last con-
dition implies that R must be the same on any two histories
bothA hma, and similarly also the same on any two histories
both A hma′).
We will require that σ maps im(ρ) into W .
Let R1 =
∑
hn∈Hn P (hn | hm, pi, ξ)eρ(hn) and let R2 =∑
hn∈Hn P (hn | hm, pi′, ξ)eρ(hn). These R1 and R2 are un-
equal by assumption, and are affine combinations of elements
of im(ρ), so they also get mapped into W by σ.
We’ll further specify that σ(R1)(hn) = 1 and
σ(R2)(hn) = −1 for all hn A hma (the properties of W
imply that the σ(Ri) are now fully specified).
There are now two claims:
1. pi = piσ◦ρ,
2. On hm, pi sacrifices all rewards in im(ρ) with certainty
to pi′.
To check optimality, we only need consider the determinis-
tic policies. Let pi′′ be a deterministic policy that would not
choose a or a′ on hm. Then for any history with P (hn |
pi′′, p) 6= 0, we must have σ(R)(hn) = 0, for all R ∈ im(ρ),
by the properties of W .
Now let pi′′ be a policy that would choose am+1 = a at
hm. The value of V (h0, σ ◦ ρ, pi′′, ξ) of pi′′ for Rσ◦ρ is:
P (hm | pi′′, ξ)
[ ∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | pi′′, ξ)eσ◦ρ(hn)
]
=
P (hm | pi′′, ξ)
[∑
o∈O
P (o | hma, ξ)
×
∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hmao, pi′′, ξ)eσ◦ρ(hn)
]
.
By the assumption that hm was the longest history on which ρ
was riggable, the second term can be rewritten with pi instead
of pi′′, and the whole expression becomes
P (hm | pi′′, ξ)
[∑
o∈O
P (o | hma, ξ)
×
∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hmao, pi, ξ)eσ◦ρ(hn)
]
=
P (hm | pi′′, ξ)
[ ∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hmpi, ξ)eσ◦ρ(hn)
]
=
P (hm | pi′′, ξ)
[ ∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hmpi, ξ)eσ◦ρ(h′n)
]
,
for any h′n A hma, by the properties of W . Then, finally, this
becomes
P (hm | pi′′, ξ)
[ ∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hmpi, ξ)eσ◦ρ(h′n)
]
=
P (hm | pi′′, ξ)
[ ∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hmpi, ξ)eσ◦ρ
]
(h′n)
=
P (hm | pi′′, ξ)σ(R1)(h′n)
=
P (hm | pi′′, ξ),
since σ is affine, and by the properties of σ(R1).
If pi′′ chooses am+1 = a′ on hm, similar reasoning shows
that for any h′n A hma′,
V (hm, σ ◦ ρ, pi′′, ξ) =P (hm | pi′′, ξ)σ(R2)(h′n) = 0,
by the properties of σ(R2) and W .
Therefore it’s clear that pi, which maximises P (hm | pi, ξ)
and chooses a on hm, maximises Rσ◦ρ and is hence piσ◦ρ.
Now we choose the history hm, and show that pi′ domi-
nates pi on it with certainty. This is easy to see, since if hn is
possible given pi = piσ◦ρ and hm, then hn A hma. Similarly,
if h′n is possible given pi
′ and hm, then h′n A hma′.
Now ifR ∈ σ(im(ρ)), thenR is inW , and henceR(hn) =
R(h′n)− 1, so R(hn) < R(h′n), showing that piσ◦ρ sacrifices
reward to pi′ with certainty.
To get necessary and sufficient, note that if ρ is unriggable,
then so is σ ◦ ρ, and by Proposition 6, unriggable ρ never
sacrifice reward with certainty.
B Making the riggable unriggable
This section will show how an unriggable ρn can be con-
structed from a riggable ρ, with algebraic manipulations.
Given a default policy pi, the expectation of any reward-
function learning process ρ′ can be defined by Equation (7):
eρ′(hm, pi, ξ) =
∑
hn∈Hn
P (hn | hm, pi, ξ)eρ′(hn).
Then the construction proceeds inductively, by making the
expectation get preserved in expectation on every history. To
get the process started, define eρ0 = eρ(h0, pi, ξ).
The construction will proceed by constructing ρm for
growing m, with m indexing the fact that ρm is well defined
(up to translation) for histories of length ≤ m.
Then to get the induction step, define the map T from his-
tories followed by an action:
T (hma) =eρm(hm, pi, ξ)
−
∑
o∈O
P (o | hma, ξ)eρ(hmao, pi, ξ). (10)
Notice that the image of T is itself a reward function. For
this process, we are going to ‘add’ reward functions R′ to
distributions.
This will be done by translation: for all hn ∈ Hn, there are
unique hm and a with hma @ hn, and define ρm+1 as being:
P (R+ T (hma) | hn, ρm+1, ξ) = P (R | hn, ρ, ξ).
Then the new reward-function learning process is defined
to be ρn.
By construction, for any m < n, eρn(hm, pi, ξ) =∑
o∈O P (o | hma, ξ)eρn(hma, pi, ξ) for all actions a. So the
expectation of ρn (conditional on pi) is equal to the expected
expectation over the next history, for whatever a is chosen.
Since this is true for all hm and all a, this expression is in fact
independent of pi, and hence ρn is unriggable.
B.1 Image of the learning process
Define im(ρ) the image of ρ to be the R ∈ R such that there
exists a history hn ∈ Hn with P (R | hn, ρ) 6= 0. Then
the ρn constructed above will have im(ρn) contained in the
affine hull of im(ρ): this is because the image of eρ is ob-
viously in the affine hull of im(ρ) (indeed, its in the convex
hull), T (hma) is a linear mix of elements of im(ρ) where the
coefficients sum to 0, and henceR+T (hma) is also an affine
combination of elements of im(ρ).
However, im(ρn) need not be in the convex hull of im(ρ).
For a simple counterexample, set n = 1, A = {a, a′},
O = {o, o′}, and have ξ so that the probability of o1 = o and
o1 = o
′ are equal to 1/2, independently of a1.
If there are two rewards R and R′, we can define ρ to be
P (R | ao, ρ) = P (R | ao′, ρ) =1,
P (R | a′o, ρ) = P (R′ | a′o′, ρ) =1.
So a forces R to be the reward, while a′ allows the observa-
tion to pick between R and R′. Thus im(ρ) = {R,R′}. Then
if pi consists of taking action a1 = a, the constructed ρ1 has:
P (R | ao, ρ1) = P (R | ao′, ρ1) =1,
P (
3
2
R− 1
2
R′ | a′o, ρ1) = P (1
2
R+
1
2
R′ | a′o′, ρ1) =1.
And 32R− 12R′ is outside the convex hull of {R,R′}.
C Unriggable to uninfluenceable
This section aims to prove:
Theorem 4 (Unriggable Uninfluencable). Let ρ be an un-
riggable learning process for ξ on M. Then there exists a
(non-unique) ρ′, and anM′ with a prior ξ′ such that:
• ξ′ generates the same environment transition probabili-
ties as ξ: for all hm, a, and o,
P (o | hma, ξ) = P (o | hma, ξ′),
• The expectations eρ and eρ′ are equal: for all hn,∑
R∈R
P (R | hn, ρ)R =
∑
R∈R
P (R | hn, ρ′)R.
• ρ′ is uninfluenceable for ξ′ onM′.
Moreover,M′ can always be taken to be the full set of possi-
ble deterministic environments.
The proof will proceed by construction of these ρ′, M′,
and ξ′. The construction is non-unique; indeed, even if ρ is
initially uninfluenceable, there is no guarantee that ρ′ will be
equal to it.
Convex combinations of probability distributions are also
probability distributions; but this construction will involve
adding (and subtracting) such distributions. Because this can
be defined many ways, we will generally be working with de-
terministic distributions, where addition and subtraction can
be defined by adding or subtracting the unique element they
assign non-zero probability to.
Let M′ be the set of all deterministic environments, so
µ ∈ M′ means that P (o | hma, µ) is 1 or 0 for all o ∈ O,
a ∈ A, and hm ∈ H. The proof will proceed by construct-
ing a deterministic η′ on M′, with ρ′ then given by ξ′ and
Equation (3).
Since η′ is deterministic, we will identify it with a map
η′ :M′ → R.
C.1 Inductive construction
To produce the required η′ and ξ′, we will use an inductive
construction. Let Mm be the set of deterministic environ-
ments for the first m observations of the agent.
The induction step will assume that we have a suitably de-
fined ξ′ and η′ on Mm−1, and will show that we can ex-
tend these definitions to Mm, and hence, by induction, to
Mn =M′.
To start the induction, note that M′0 has a single, trivial,
environment, µ0. Then define P (µ0 | ξ′) = 1, and recall that
since ρ is unriggable, expressions like P (R | hm, ρ, ξ) make
sense for all histories hm, without needing to condition on
policies. Thus define:
η′(µ0) =
∑
R∈R
P (R | h0)R.
Now for the inductive step.
Definitions and preliminaries
Elements of Am (ordered sets of m actions) will be desig-
nated by terms like am, bm, and cm. Write aml for the l-th
action in aml , and a
m,l for the l first actions of am. Write
al @ bm means that al consists of the first l actions of bm (ie
bm,l = al). Elements of Om will be designated by terms like
om and qm, and treated similarly to the actions above.
Let a(hm) be the actions of hm, and o(hm) be the obser-
vations of hm. In this section, we will often write histories
in a different but equivalent fashion, as o(hm)a(hm), all the
actions in order followed by all the observations in order. By
abuse of notation, we will write hm = o(hm)a(hm), ignor-
ing whether the actions and observations are interleaved or
grouped.
Since it is deterministic, any element µm ∈ Mm can be
seen as a map fromAm toOm: the history hm = µm(am)am
being the only history such that P (hm | am, µm) = 1 (recall
that am can be seen as the deterministic policy of taking ac-
tion ami on turn i, whatever the history is at that point).
Indeed, by this definition, µm can be seen as map from
Al → Ol, for l ≤ m, with alµm(al) the shorter history gen-
erated by the first l actions being al.
Let f be any map that takes Al to Ol, for all 1 ≤ l ≤ m.
Then it easy to see that f corresponds to an element ofMm
iff f(al) v f(bk) whenever al v bk (the observations gener-
ated by f depend only on past actions, not future actions).
To simplify notation, for l < m, we’ll write µl(am) rather
than µl(am,l).
The inductive step: priors
Given µm ∈Mm+1, we can map it intoMm by just restrict-
ing it to theAl, for l ≤ m. Conversely, given µm ∈Mm and
g : Am+1 → O, we can construct an element µmg ofMm+1
by defining, for l ≤ m:
µmg (a
l) =µm(al)
µmg (a
m+1) =µm(am+1)g(am+1).
We will define the prior ξ′ by taking the probability
P (µm−1 | ξ′) of µm−1, and splitting that among all the envi-
ronments of the type µm−1g . Specifically:
P (µmg | ξ′) =P (µm | ξ′)×∏
am+1∈Am+1
P (g(am) | µm(am+1)am+1, ξ).
(11)
Notice the use of ξ in this definition to compute the proba-
bility of the next observation.
Then the first thing to note is:
Lemma 8. The prior ξ and ξ′ generate the same environment
transition probabilities: for all hm, a, and o,
P (o | hma, ξ) = P (o | hma, ξ′).
Proof. Induction is not needed for this proof. Write hm as
omam. By definition:
P (o | omama, ξ′)
=∑
µm+1∈Mm+1
P (µm+1 | omam, ξ′)P (o | omama, µm+1).
Since the µm are deterministic, P (µm+1 | omam, ξ′) is 0
if µm+1(am) 6= om, and otherwise:
P (µm+1 | omam, ξ′)
=
P (µm+1 | ξ′)∑
λm+1∈Sm+1 P (λm+1 | ξ′)
.
Where Sm+1 ⊂ Mm+1 is defined to be those λm+1 with
λm+1(am) = om. Notice that this is really a condition on the
restriction to Mm, so define Sm as the restriction of Sm+1
toMm.
Let g be any function from Am+1 to O that sends ama to
o. Then P (o | omama, µm+1) is 1 if µm+1 = µmg for some
such g and µm the restriction of µm+1 to Mm. Otherwise,
that expression is 0. So, putting these together,
P (o | omama, ξ′)
=∑
g:g(ama)=o
∑
µm∈Sm P (µ
m
g | ξ′)∑
g′:Am→O
∑
λm∈Sm P (λ
m
g′ | ξ′)
=
P (o | omama, ξ)
1
×
∑
µm∈Sm P (µ
m | ξ′)∑
λm∈Sm P (λm | ξ′)
,
since summing over g is marginalising out all other probabil-
ity terms in the product in Equation (11).
Thus P (o | omam, ξ) = P (o | omam, ξ′).
Inductive step: map from environments to rewards
Since ρ is unriggable, for any hm, R ∈ R, and a ∈ A,
P (R | hm, ρ) =
∑
o∈O
P (R | hm, ρ)P (o | hma, ξ)
=
∑
o∈O
P (R | hm, ρ)P (o | hma, ξ′),
(12)
substituting ξ′ for ξ by Lemma 8. Define the expectation op-
erator eρ : H → R as
eρ(hm) =
∑
R∈R
P (R | hm, ρ)R.
Taking the expectation of the terms in Equation (12) gives:
eρ(hm) =
∑
o∈O
eρ(hmao)P (o | hma, ξ′). (13)
Now define the τ operator, which maps histories of length
≥ 1 to reward functions, as
τ(hmao) = eρ(hmao)− eρ(hm). (14)
Taking Equation (14), multiplying by P (o | hma, ξ′) and
summing over o gives∑
o∈O
P (o | hma, ξ′)τ(hmao)
=(∑
o∈O
eρ(hmao)P (o | hma, ξ′)
)
− eρ(hm)
=
0,
(15)
by Equation (13).
We are now ready to define η′ :Mm+1 → R, inductively.
On µmg , it is given by
η′(µmg ) =
(
η′(µm) +
∑
am+1
τ(µmg (a
m+1)am+1)
)
.
The ρ′ is defined by Equation (3); this gives the expectation
of ρ′ as
eρ′(hm) =
∑
µm
P (µm | hm, ξ′)η′(µm).
A first thing to note is that for any µm:∑
g:Am+1→O
P (µmg | hmao, ξ′) = P (µm | hm, ξ′),
by marginalising over the g. Hence∑
µm,g
P (µmg | hmao, ξ′)η′(µm) =
∑
µm
P (µm | hm, ξ′)η′(µm)
=eρ′(hm).
So, if we now want to compute eρ′ on the history hmao,
we get:
eρ′(hmao) =
∑
µm,g
P (µmg | hmao, ξ′)η′(µmg )
=
∑
µm,g
P (µmg | hmao, ξ′)(
η′(µm) +
∑
am+1
τ(µmg (a
m+1)am+1)
)
=eρ′(hm)+∑
µm,g,am+1
P (µmg | hmao, ξ′)τ(µmg (am+1)am+1).
Let bm = a(hm) and om = o(hm). Then for any am+1 6=
bma, ∑
µm,g
P (µmg | hmao, ξ′)τ(µmg (am+1)am+1)
=∑
qm,o′,µm,g:
µm(am+1)=qm
g(am+1)=o′
P (µmg | hmao, ξ′)τ(am+1qmo′).
For fixed µm and qm with µm(am+1) = qm, this is∑
o′,g:
g(am+1)=o′
P (µmg | hmao, ξ′)τ(am+1qmo′).
Marginalising over g and using Equation (11) gives, for some
constant C:∑
o′,g:
g(am+1)=o′
C × P (o′ | µm(am+1)am+1)τ(am+1qmo′),
which is zero by Equation (15). Summing over zero remains
zero, so we can ignore all terms where am 6= bma, hence
eρ′(hmao) =eρ′(hm)
+
∑
µm,g
P (µmg | hmao, ξ′)τ(µmg (bma)bma)
= eρ′(hm) +
∑
µm,g
P (µmg | hmao, ξ′)τ(hmao)
= eρ′(hm) + τ(hmao)
= eρ′(hm) + eρ(hmao)− eρ(hm).
By the induction hypothesis, eρ′(hm) = eρ(hm), so we have
shown that for all hm, a, and o,
eρ′(hmao) = eρ(hmao).
Consequently, by induction, eρ′ = eρ on all ofH: so ρ and ρ′
have same expectation.
Now, ρ′ is uninfluenceable by construction, coming from
η′ and ξ′ ∈ ∆(M′), so this completes the proof.
C.2 Example: parental career instruction
Take the unriggable example in Section 3.4, ie the one with
prior ξ2 which puts equal probability on all environments in
M = {µBB , µBD, µDB , µDD}.
Then
η′(µ0) = eρ(h0) =
1
2
(RB +RD) ,
and hence τ(MB) = τ(FB) = 12 (RB −RH), while
τ(MD) = τ(FD) = 12 (RD −RC).
So, on µBB ,
η′(µBB) =η′(µ0) +
∑
a∈A
τ(aC)
= +
3
2
RB − 1
2
RD.
Similarly,
η′(µBD) = η′(µDB) = +
1
2
RB +
1
2
RD
η′(µDD) =− 1
2
RB +
3
2
RD.
Then one can check that, for example,
eρ′(MB)
=∑
R∈R
P (R | η′, µ)P (µ |MB, ξ)
=
1
2
(+
3
2
RB − 1
2
RD) +
1
2
(+
1
2
RB +
1
2
RD)
=
RB .
These η′ and ρ′ and not unique; for example, the following
η′ works equally well:
η′(µBB) =2RB
η′(µBD) =0
η′(µDB) =0
η′(µDD) =2RD.
Total information
Consider the following variant of the ξ2 setup: the parents
write down their answers, the agent then choose M (mother)
or F (father), and then both answers are revealed – the rele-
vant one from the chosen parent, and the irrelevant one.
The ρ can be defined by:
P (RB |M(BB), ρ) = P (RB |M(BD), ρ) =1
P (RB | F (BB), ρ) = P (RB | F (DB), ρ) =1
P (RD |M(DD), ρ) = P (RD |M(DB), ρ) =1
P (RD |M(DD), ρ) = P (RD | F (BD), ρ) =1.
The construction of η′ above will not work here: the agent
will know the underlying environment because of the sec-
ond observation, so we get results like η′(µBD) = RB and
η′(µBD) = RD, a contradiction.
However, Theorem 4 still applies. What happens is that we
need to extendM toM′ by including twelve impossible en-
vironments: environments where the agent’s actions changes
what the parents have already written. These are environ-
ments such as µM→(BD),F→(BB).
The ξ′ generated then gives equal probability 1/16 to
each of these 16 environments; note that even though
twelves of these environments are impossible, the ξ′ still
describes the original setup; the impossible environment
µM→(BD),F→(BB) is compensated for by the impossible en-
vironment µM→(BB),F→(BD), giving a very possible distri-
bution over observations.
Write µM→(BD),F→(BB) as µ(BD)(BB). Then, as above,
η′(µ0) = eρ(h0) = 12 (RB +RD).
Then the environments µBB , µ(BB)(DB), µ(BD)(DB),
and µ(BD)(BB) all have the same image under η′, namely
+ 32RB − 12RD. Similarly, the environments µDD,
µ(DD)(BD), µ(DB)(BD), and µ(DB)(DD) all map to− 12RB+
3
2RD, and the remaining eight environments get mapped to
+ 12RB +
1
2RD.
Now the ρ′ proceeds as before; the difference is that h1 =
F (BB), for example, no longer fixes the underlying envi-
ronment. Four environments are compatible with it: µBB ,
µ(BB)(BD), µ(BB)(DB), and µ(BB)(DD); and the average
of the η′ of these four environments is RB , which is non-
coincidentally equal to eρ(F (BB)).
Thus the addition of impossible environments allows eρ to
be expressed as e′ρ for ρ
′ an uninfluenceable learning process.
